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The basing demand on doxastic justification is a widely held and highly intu-
itive dogma of contemporary epistemology. In my [2015, AJP], I argued (only)
that the dialectical significance of this dogma is severely limited by our lack of
independent grounds for endorsing it. Oliveira [2015, AJP] sought to defend the
basing demand on doxastic justification. Here I explain why Oliveira’s attempted
defense of the basing demand misses its mark. I also briefly suggest that there
is an alternative way of defending the basing demand. The alternative way is
reconciliatory: it shows that most epistemologists may have been right to insist
on such a demand, but still wrong to treat it as a dialectically powerful tool in
the assessment of certain substantive epistemological theories.
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1 Introduction
The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification is typically character-
ized as the distinction between having justification to believe that P (= propositional
justification) versus having a justified belief that P (= doxastic justification). When
characterized in this way the distinction between propositional and doxastic justifica-
tion appears to highlight the obvious difference between having justification to be in a
state versus being in a justified state.
Virtually all epistemologists reject the idea that doxastic justification is simply
belief that P together with having justification to believe that P. Rather, they hold
that at least part of what makes the difference between these two kinds of justification
has to do with what one’s belief is based on. For example, Alston [1989: 108] claims
that:
1
[it’s] conceptually true that one is justified in believing that p iff one’s belief
that p is based on an adequate ground.
And Huemer [2007: 40-41] says:
...justification for believing that p is not to be confused with justified belief
that p... a justified belief must be held because of what provides adequate
justification for it.
We’ll capture this idea in the following way:
The Basing Demand (TBD): Necessarily, S has a (doxastically) justified
belief that P only if S believes that P on the basis of an epistemically
appropriate reason to believe that P.1
TBD is of particular interest because it’s an intuition with bite. For it facilitates pow-
erful arguments in support of heavy-weight epistemological doctrines. Here are just
a few examples: Pollock and Cruz [1999] use TBD to undermine coherentism, and if
they’re right about that they cast a shadow over subjective bayesian epistemology as
well; Silins [2007] and Neta [2010: 694] both rely on TBD in their justification of lib-
eralism about perceptual justification; Huemer [2007] uses TBD to justify phenomenal
conservatism; and Comesana and McGrath [2014] use TBD to justify non-factualist
views about reasons. TBD is able to do this work because it asserts a link–i.e. the
basing relation–between the bases of one’s justified beliefs and the source of one’s justi-
fication to believe. If such a link exists, TBD threatens epistemological views that drive
a wedge between one’s source of justification and the basis of one’s justified beliefs (like
coherentism and anti-liberal views of perceptual justification). Similarly, epistemolog-
ical views that are consistent with such a link are views that are supported to some
extent by TBD (e.g. phenomenal conservatism and non-factualist views of reasons).
Accordingly, TBD has seemed to many to have the dialectical power to help resolve
(or at least advance) various disputes in epistemology since TBD is typically taken to
be a fixed-point.
I [2015] suggested a reassessment of TBD. I motivated this reassessment in part
by considering how TBD’s counterpart would fare in the moral domain. The answer:
it would fare quite badly since dominant moral theories entail that one can act in a
morally justified way even if one’s reasons for acting (i.e. the basis of one’s action)
is not morally appropriate. Just consider someone who saves a drowning child but
their reason for doing so is to enslave that child when they reach adulthood: if one
saves the child, that act is morally justified even if one’s reasons for acting are morally
reprehensible. But if one’s reasons for acting are irrelevant to the moral justification
1See I [2015] for lengthy citations. Some epistemologists prefer a qualified version of TBD since,
arguably, there can be some instances of reason-free justified beliefs. The point here is that there are
a wide range of cases where one’s justification is dependent on one’s epistemic reasons (e.g. inferential
and perceptual beliefs) and in those cases most epistemologists think a suitably qualified version of
TBD holds.
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of an action, why should one’s reasons for believing be important for the epistemic
justification of a belief?
2 On Oliveira’s Defense of TBD
Oliveira [2015] sought to undermine my concern with TBD by undermining the follow-
ing argument:
The Pairity Argument
(1) When the term ‘doxastic justification’ is used in epistemic theory it
expresses the same concept that ‘moral justification’ does in moral theory,
namely, the concept of permissibility within a certain domain.
(2) An action can be morally justified (=permitted) even if it’s not per-
formed for morally appropriate reasons.
(3) What’s true of the structure of moral justification is true of the structure
of epistemic justification.
(4) So, a belief can be doxastically justified (=permitted) even if it’s not
held for epistemically appropriate reasons. (from 1-3)
If (4) is true, then TBD is false.2
As a matter of book-keeping, it’s worth noting that Oliveira’s summary doesn’t
accurately represent my [2015] argument or conclusion. I [2015: 374] explicitly refrain
from invoking any commitment to (3) as a premise in my paper. Rather, I use the
moral case as an analogy to motivate rethinking what support there could be for TBD
in the epistemic case. Moreover, my conclusion is not that TBD is false. Rather, I
[2015: section 3] survey a wide range of ways of justifying TBD and shows that they
either fail or they depend on assumptions that are theory-dependent in a way that
makes certain appeals to TBD by prominent epistemologists question-begging.
Now, Oliveira’s [2015: 391-392] primary move in defense of TBD is to draw attention
to an important difference between agents’ actions and their beliefs. For when it comes
to states (like belief) that are not voluntarily brought about (and hence “non-agential”
in some important sense) Oliveira presupposes that it’s always infelicitous to read
claims of the form ‘S’s φ-ing is permitted’ in a way that involves relating an agent to a
norm which the agent conforms to. Rather, such claims are best understood as positive
assessments of a state of affairs that involve agents conforming to an ideal to a sufficient
degree. So, for example, a claim like ‘S’s believing that P is epistemically permitted’
should be understood as a claim about the epistemic goodness of a state of affairs: ‘it
is epistemically good that S believes that P’. If belief is non-agential in the way that
Oliveira asserts, then (3) is arguably false. And if his interpretation of justification
ascriptions is correct–i.e. that they’re best understood in terms of goodness–then (1)
2(1)-(4) is not Oliveira’s phrasing of the argument, but it’s a faithful representation of his target.
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is false too. More than that, if belief is deeply non-agential then I [2015: 377-78] seem
wrong in my appeal to concepts like blameworthiness in my alternative explanation of
what’s intuitively problematic in cases of bad basing.
There are, however, various problems with Oliveira’s defense of TBD. First, consider
Oliveira’s assumption that a belief’s responsiveness to evidence should be understood
in a completely non-agential way (like the swinging of a clock-hand). When one sur-
veys the epistemological literature on belief and agency virtually all epistemologists
agree that belief is not agential in the very same way that paradigmatically free ac-
tions are, e.g. actions like raising one’s arm that are directly responsive to an agent’s
intentions in normal conditions. But even so, most (or at least very many) epistemol-
ogists also think that beliefs are sufficiently agential (and thus sufficiently unlike the
movements of a clock-hand) to ground true ascriptions of responsibility, praiseworthi-
ness, and blameworthiness to agents for holding their beliefs. The literature here is
vast and undiscussed by Oliviera. So at the very least there is a significant range of
epistemologists who have to deal with the Pairity Argument if they wish to leverage
TBD in a dialectically fruitful way.3
There is a further pressing issue for Oliveira’s attempted refutation of (3). It con-
cerns the relevant disanalogy thatsought to highlight. For suppose Oliveira were correct
that the only coherent way to understand statements of the form ‘S is permitted to
believe P’ is in terms of ‘it being epistemically good that S believe P’. Even then, there
exists a disanalogy between the moral assessment of action and the epistemological
assessment of belief. This is because moral theories often have something to say about
which states of affairs are good. Indeed, it is arguable that a complete and coherent
moral theory will come with an axiology that implies not only that some actions are
permitted but also imply that the corresponding states of affairs involving permitted
action are good! From this it will follow that circumstances where people act in morally
permitted ways but for morally inappropriate reasons are circumstances where there
is a morally good state of affairs (the state of affairs just involving S’s φ-ing) nested
within a more inclusive state of affairs that is morally suboptimal (the state of affairs
involving S’s φ-ing on the basis of morally inappropriate reasons). This motivates the
3For example, some have argued that beliefs can be volitional in a way that allows them to be
assessed on the same level as actions (Weatherson [2008]; Peels [2015]; and Roeber [forthcoming]).
Oliveira does note this. But there’s more. For others think that it makes fine sense to assess both
actions and beliefs in terms of responsiveness to reasons even if the responsiveness in the case of belief
is not directly voluntary (Schroeder [2015]; Lord [2018]; Kiesewetter [2017]). This is related to the
deliberative ‘ought’ (and the deliberative sense of ‘justified’), of which Schroeder [2011: 24] says: “The
sense of ‘action’ on which I claim that the deliberative ‘ought’ relates agents to actions is very broad.
It can be the case thatMax ought to believe that p, or that Max ought to be saddened by recent events,
but believing that p and being saddened by recent events are not commonly thought of as actions.”
See also Wedgwood [2017], Way and Whiting [2016], Kiesewetter [2017], and Lord [2018] for further
discussion and endorsement. Notice too that there are very well explored theories of responsible belief
that don’t make doxastic responsibility (and hence the fittingness of praise and blame) turn upon the
extent to which belief mirrors actions in terms of voluntariness (Oshana [1997]; Scanlon [1998]; Heller
[2000]; Hieronymi [2008]; McHugh [2014], [2013]; Peels [2017]; Rettler [2018]; and Smith [2008]). See
also Sosa’s Judgement and Agency (2015).
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very same question thatraised but in a way that’s immune to Oliveira’s worries about
doxastic agency. Moreover, it identifies a positive epistemic property that is absent
in cases where agents fail to base their beliefs appropriately: there is a good state of
affairs nested within a larger suboptimal state of affairs.
Given Oliveira’s preferred normative ideology, this is equivalent to saying that one
can have a doxastically justified belief even if it’s badly based. And, as far ascan tell,
Oliveira has offered no new reason to reject such a possibility that I [2015] didn’t already
address. Accordingly, considerations of doxastic agency seem almost entirely irrelevant
to the question of whether or not TBD is true; at most, doxastic agency concerns our
interpretation of the deontic language we employ when talking about TBD.
3 Doxastic Justification and Procedural Justification
There is an alternative way to undermine the Pairty Argument that I failed to consider.
It has to do with an ambiguity in ascriptions of doxastic justification. On the one
hand, when epistemologists characterize ‘doxastic justification’ they do so in a way
that seems to make the object of assessment a belief state. (See the citations in the
introduction.) Call this the stative conception of doxastic justification. On the other
hand, when epistemologists provide substantive conditions for doxastic justification,
like TBD, what they are offering is a procedural norm, i.e. a norm that places limits on
the permissible ways of arriving at a certain state. Call this the procedural conception
of doxastic justification.
It is this procedural issue that John Turri [2010: 315] drew attention to when he
wrote that:
...we should ask ourselves whether it is plausible to think that the way in
which a subject makes use of his reasons matters not to whether his belief
is well founded [=doxastically justified]. ... In evaluating beliefs we are
evaluating a kind of performance, the performance of a cognitive agent in
representing the world as being a certain way, and when performing with
materials (which, in cognitive affairs, will include reasons or evidence), the
success, or lack thereof, of one’s performance will depend crucially on the
way in which one makes use of those materials.
Turri is asking about the epistemic successes of having a doxastically justified belief,
and we can tell that even Turri is thinking of “doxastic justification” in the stative
sense when asking about procedural norms for doxastic justification. For otherwise his
comment would be trivially true. That is, it’s trivially true that having a procedurally
justified belief–i.e. having a belief that one arrived at via a justified procedure–depends
on the way in which one arrived at one’s belief. That’s just what it means to talk about
procedural justification. The non-trivial question that Turri is asking is whether or not
having a statively justified belief depends on whether or not that belief is also proce-
durally justified. This is a substantive question all normative theories must address.
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For in practical reasoning, politics, and morality we can ask wether (practically, polit-
ically, morally) justified processes are processes that always and only lead to justified
outcomes. Consider the process of having carefully selected juries decide whether a per-
son is guilty. Many view this process as justified in some important normative sense
even if it sometimes yields unjustified verdicts. Similarly, we can imagine unjustified
processes that sometimes lead to justified verdicts. Turri is, quite insightfully, raising
these questions for our thinking about the epistemic domain.
These reflections draw attention to two readings of TBD:
(TBD-Procedural) Necessarily, S has a procedurally justified belief that P
(=a belief that S arrived at via a justified procedure) only if S believes that
P on the basis of an epistemically appropriate reason to believe that P.
(TBD-Stative) Necessarily, S has a statively justified belief (=a justified
belief) that P only if S believes that P on the basis of an epistemically
appropriate reason to believe that P.
This distinction gives rise to a reconciliatory response to I [2015] and the Parity Argu-
ment. For if the term ‘doxastic justification’ is ambiguous between stative and procedu-
ral readings, then two things are likely to occur. First, TBD will seem like the obvious
truth that all epistemologists have treated it as. For it seems like the set of justified
belief-forming procedures can only include belief-forming processes that are responsive
to one’s epistemic reasons; after all, procedures that are unresponsive (or improperly
responsive) to epistemic reasons will be regarded as epistemically reckless. Second, if
‘doxastic justification’ is ambiguous between stative and procedural readings we should
expect exactly the kind of disanalogy that I [2015] drew attention to. For TBD-Stative
is about states that one is permitted to be in. And when talking about permitted
states/actions, dominant moral theories entail that morally permissible states/actions
can be arrived at in morally impermissible and blameworthy ways.
It’s easy to see that this highly tentative “reconciliation” favors my primary conclu-
sion about the limited dialectical value of TBD. For as noted above and as explored
in more depth by I [2015], the dialectical power of TBD lies with it’s linking one’s
bases for being in a justified state and what justifies being in that state. This is
what TBD-Stative does. TBD-Procedural asserts no such link, it’s just about justified
belief-forming procedures.4 Accordingly, it was likely correct in to (implicitly) assess
TBD-Stative in my [2015], since that’s the disambiguation of TBD that’s in play in
the aforementioned discussions of coherentism, liberalism, phenomenal conservatism,
and factivity about reasons.
4See I [2015: section 3, Reason#6] for a discussion of the following way of bridging the procedural
and stative principles: S’s belief state is justified only if S arrived at S’s belief in reliable way. This links
the justification of states to reliable procedures, and it is a way of justifying TBD-Stative. However,
as I [2015] explains, it’s not a way of justifying TBD-Stative that’s fit for the dialectical purposes that
it’s standardly put to.
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